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2767 
THE FOURTH QUADRANT 
Jonathan Zittrain* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1990s, Larry Lessig suggested a way to systematize the study 
of cyberlaw.  He started with a blank PowerPoint slide and placed a red dot 
at its center.  The dot represented you:  an individual buffeted by extrinsic 
forces.  The forces take up the rest of the slide, each pushing the dot one 
way or another.  They are laws, norms, code, and market.  Lessig’s insight 
was that these forces are each a form of control, and thus a form of law.  To 
study cyberlaw by studying only that which is formally labeled law—that 
which emanates from sovereigns—was to miss the influences exerted 
through other means and by other parties.  Moreover, since the government 
can create laws to influence norms, markets, and code, there are many paths 
for regulators to push around the poor embattled individual, more subtle 
and perhaps more difficult to resist than direct regulation.1 
Lessig’s structure inspired people to think more about just how 
constructed their environments were, and to appreciate a much broader 
range of levers of control.  It was a call to action directed at the red dot. 
Nearly fifteen years later, the libertarian mindset in part captured by 
Lessig’s existential dot has been complemented by an increasingly 
communitarian sensibility online.  The intervening years have seen the rise 
of enterprises that weave individual actions into a collective whole.  Web 
1.0 might be represented by the home page and Web 2.0 by the blog, 
including others’ comments.  Web 3.0 is activity under a common umbrella, 
a centripetal recentralizing of user effort—but not by the state.  Wikipedia, 
Couchsurfing, Facebook, Twitter—each is a platform accumulating users’ 
work into a whole greater than a sum of parts.  Twitter isn’t just a 
convenient microblog for a particular user; it’s an echo chamber of tweets 
and retweets that cultivates and accelerates popular memes with simple 
clicks by its users. 
 
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School and Harvard Kennedy School of Government; 
Professor of Computer Science, Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences; Co-
founder, Berkman Center for Internet & Society.  The author wishes to acknowledge the 
contributions of Tim Berners-Lee in the development of this essay, in particular in 
originating the mirror-as-you-link idea, and participants in the Fordham symposium that 
inspired the piece.  The author also thanks Heather Casteel for excellent assistance in 
research and in drawing from talks at Columbia and Duke Universities for this essay. 
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I want to suggest an additional framework for thinking about these 
phenomena, and for thinking about the Internet as a whole.  The core idea is 
that an undertaking can be understood along two surprisingly independent 
dimensions. The first is how “generative” it is—in essence, whether it is 
meaningfully open to contributions from outsiders, where the line between 
insiders and outsiders is blurred or nonexistent.  The second is how singular 
it is—whether it is one of a kind for those affected by it, or one of many.  
Charting these two fundamental characteristics for an activity can help us 
understand the problems that are likely to develop—and the options for 
solving them. 
Envision a four quadrant chart with two axes.  The X-axis runs between 
what I call hierarchy on one end and polyarchy on the other.  These may not 
be the perfect words, but I use them with a particular meaning in mind.  The 
term “hierarchy” on the left side connotes a system for which there is no 
alternative, either because it does not exist, because it would be too costly, 
or because law precludes it.  For these or any other reasons, those subject to 
the system do not have a lot of choice.  The right side is labeled 
“polyarchy.”  Polyarchy is defined by choice.  The more choice an actor 
has, the further to the right side of the chart the actor exists.  In this context, 
choice is the ability to choose among various regimes or systems in which 
you might exist.  The second axis, positioned somewhat counterintuitively 
at right angles to the first, divides “top-down” and “bottom-up.”2  Position 
on this axis is determined by the extent to which those empowered to shape 
the system—to make its rules and enforce them—share an identity with the 
people of the system.  To the extent that there is a separation between those 
who make the rules and those who live under them, the system is closer to 
the top of the axis.  To the extent that there is no separation, that the rules or 
constraints emanate as readily from one person as another within the 
system, it is closer to the bottom. 
 
 
 
  2. This chart is adapted from prior scholarship, in which the Y-axis represented the 
division between “sterile” and “generative.” See generally JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE 
OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008). ZITTRAIN_10_04_21_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/23/2010  9:52 AM 
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I.  PLOTTING IN THE FOUR QUADRANTS 
A.  Governments and Systems 
At the risk of a little imprecision, even butchery, of political science 
terminology, we can plot some examples of governance systems on the 
chart.  In the upper left might be something like an authoritarian regime.  In 
an authoritarian system, the rules are fairly clear, and there are a lot of 
them.  They are enforced upon the citizens, who do not get to make them, 
which positions it high on the chart.  Generally citizens do not get to leave, 
which is how the regime is able to enforce unpleasant rules.  If it were easy 
to get out of the system, everyone would flee.  That places it leftward on the 
chart. 
A little bit further down, or potentially much further down but still north 
of the horizontal axis, would be an indirect representative system such as in 
the United States.  Democracies are going to be more responsive to those 
who are regulated because there are regular elections.  Citizens do not make 
rules directly, but they can always throw the bums who do out of office.  
This popular control mechanism is an indirect ongoing dialogue, a rather 
crude method of feedback between those who regulate and those who are 
regulated.  Every so often, the citizens, like the lowly spy in the game 
Stratego who yet gets to kill the general, determine the professional fate of 
those who make the rules. 
Federalism is further to the right, towards polyarchy.  These systems may 
still not include the people very much, except via elections, but the point of 
the federalist system, in theory, is choice.  Within the United States, the 
theory goes, no one has to live in one state because it is possible to pick up 
stakes and move.  There is a high transaction cost in moving, but less and 
less over time.  This is what I mean by polyarchy:  the idea that the 
availability of many systems provokes a certain kind of competition. 
Speaking of competition, on the very far right we might place 
corporatism.  By this I am referring to the classical understanding of 
markets.  If the markets are dominated by large firms with various barriers 
to entry for smaller players, the position is up as well as right.  Imagine 
there is a product you want, and the corporations that make that product or 
who choose to enter that market are desperate for you to buy it.  They want 
to make the price as low as they can get away with if it means more sales.  
They want to shape their products to your desires.  In that sense, there is the 
same kind of feedback between those who buy the products and those who 
make them as there is between those who pass the laws and those who live 
under them.  Still, we would not mistake the entities that make the products 
for the people who buy them.  An individual does not get a vote in making 
the product; in particular, an individual does not get to walk into the 
building and start making his own products.  There is still a difference 
between those who create and those who buy. ZITTRAIN_10_04_21_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/23/2010  9:52 AM 
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Down in the lower right corner one might put anarchists, in the sense of 
those who want no government at all.  Anarchists believe that the more 
people are able to do whatever they wish, the happier they will be.  The 
source of constraint is as likely to be the person next to you as it is those 
bureaucrats in government.  Under anarchy, the regulation or constraint 
upon a person could come from anywhere, just as that person could enforce 
a constraint upon anyone else. 
Slightly above anarchy one might place libertarianism, at least that strain 
of libertarianism that is highly skeptical of government in general and 
believes that the best means to security is a shotgun.  Under this sense of 
the word, libertarians want a system where you rely on yourself, your 
neighbors, your family, or your friends for protection and for constraint. 
In the bottom left might belong something like communitarianism.  This 
embodies the idea that there are times when the needs of the whole may 
outweigh the desires of one particular member—indeed, where individual 
identity can only be understood through membership in a group.  Perhaps 
what the people want is supposed to somehow emanate from such a low 
point within the community that the format for decision making really is the 
town hall meeting.  This system can still bind people to any given decision 
who do not agree with it; in that sense it is hierarchy.  In the communitarian 
conception, if one person does not like some decision, it is not so clear that 
he gets to leave.  He owes something to the community, including a duty to 
stay even when things do not go his way.  The communitarian system is 
supposed to embody participation in a much richer way than by merely 
casting a vote, the way some of the systems in the upper left work. ZITTRAIN_10_04_21_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/23/2010  9:52 AM 
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B.  Movement and Evolution in the Four Quadrants 
These four quadrants are useful for more than merely plotting static 
objects.  We can add verbs to the picture and begin to tell stories about 
political, corporate, and technological change by tracking the migration of 
various actors across the chart.  For instance, most people are familiar with 
the antiglobalization story.  According to some, globalization is a problem.  
Part of the complaint of, say, G-20 protestors is that corporations used to 
exist on the right side of the chart, in polyarchy, where they competed with 
each other.  Recently, however, these corporations either got together in a 
smoke-filled room and cut deals, or just got so big that no meaningful 
competition remains.  As a result, many of these corporations exist closer to 
hierarchy.  We, the citizens of the corporate system, do not even have the 
chance to throw these bums out the way we might an unpopular politician.  
Corporations are only responsive to us as consumers, and too many groups 
of consumers are not in the market for a particular product but are still 
affected by its producer’s so-called externalities. 
Another story we could tell might be the race to the bottom.  A 
government begins on the left, in hierarchy, but because capital and people 
flow so easily from one place to another, it might slide towards polyarchy.  
Eventually it ends up on the far right, just as if it were another corporation.3  
When this happens, any hope of regulating in a positive sense is greatly 
thinned out.  If one entity pushes too hard, its citizen-customers leave and 
go somewhere else.  Depending on your normative prior commitments, this 
is either a serious problem or the race to the top.  Some might view this as 
the ideal system, where usurious taxes get forced down through competition 
because businesses will flow to the places that offer them the best package.4 
II.  THE INTERNET AND THE FOUR QUADRANTS 
A.  Online Enforcement 
Consider mapping a story about the Internet and the process of online 
control and regulation.5  Governments, for the most part, still occupy the 
upper left corner of the chart.  People occupy the lower right.  Governments 
have the power to act directly on their citizens, to make laws about what the 
people are allowed to see, or know, or say.  Governments can regulate 
sedition, copyright infringement, or anything else.  Defamation, for 
instance, is triggered by fellow people but mediated by the government.  
 
  3. This problem was beautifully envisioned by Neal Stephenson in SNOW  CRASH 
(1992). 
 4.  See, e.g., Posting of Matthew Shaer to Horizons, http://www.csmonitor.com/
Innovation/Horizons/2010/0302/Welcome-to-Google-the-new-capital-of-Kansas (Mar. 2, 
2010) (describing Topeka’s effort to entice Google to select Topeka as the test market for its 
ultra-high-speed broadband by renaming the city “Google” for a month). 
  5. For a general overview of the development and governance of the Internet, see 
DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE:  NOTES ON THE STATE OF CYBERSPACE 
(2009). ZITTRAIN_10_04_21_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/23/2010  9:52 AM 
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The law deals with the individual directly and what he or she is allowed to 
utter, whether or not it is laundered through another platform, such as the 
Internet.  These are forms of regulation designed to keep you in line, for 
better or for worse. 
In the online context, however, there is another approach to enforcement:  
the terms of service violation.  There is no need to involve the authorities; a 
user can try to get AOL or another online service provider to protect her by 
kicking off a subscriber.  Again, Larry Lessig had a very powerful insight 
about this dynamic, which he described as an implication of “Code is 
Law.”6  The environment itself can control a person just as readily as the 
government’s naked exercise of regulatory power.  In turn, the government 
can tell these online intermediaries how they must shape their service.   
There are rules about e-mail retention, and if the government wants to 
identify any particular user, the intermediary can be forced to disclose that 
information, as long as it has the credit card records. 
Lessig’s claim was that this path of regulation, in part because of its 
indirect nature, is the more effective and therefore more worrisome path.  
When the government comes after individuals, we tend to be suspicious.  
When the government comes after people through brands, individuals tend 
not to notice that it is government regulation affecting their lives. 
This story is evident throughout the development of the Internet.  The 
Internet came about in the lower part of the chart in the sense that it was 
built by people with no particular profit motive, who were not looking 
exclusively to compete against anything.  The Internet does not have a 
CEO.  It has a group of people who decide to collaborate and experiment 
with networking.  As the Internet starts to get more popular, however, there 
came to be a business component to it.  The first Internet access came 
through proprietary services, such as AOL and Prodigy, that began popping 
up to offer Internet service to people who otherwise were not a part of the 
founding clique.  Back around 1990, these companies controlled most 
people’s access to and experience of the Internet.  Eventually, however, 
people moved away from these original access points; they began signing 
up for direct Internet service.  As this took place, the Internet became more 
and more influential, even if you were not yourself a part of it.  It is now a 
firmly entrenched hierarchy; there is no direct competition for the Internet.  
It became such a gathering place that the original players essentially died 
off.  Their names still exist, but they were just rebranded as little areas on 
the new Internet. 
We then end up in a configuration where anything can be built on top of 
the Internet.  Consider, for example, Friendster.7  There was a time when 
Friendster seemed important.  It turned out that Friendster was not as fun as 
we thought it would be, but other options came along.  As more and more 
applications come about, the realm of competition is no longer among the 
 
  6. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 5, 88–94. 
  7.  Friendster, http://www.friendster.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). ZITTRAIN_10_04_21_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/23/2010  9:52 AM 
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original gated proprietary services, but among different applications, built 
by companies that all run according to Internet protocol.  By 2008, all of 
these applications and online services shaped what their subscribers saw 
and experienced, just as those intermediaries in last generation’s 
corporations did.  Under the new system, you can still try and reach people 
over the Net who do bad things.  It may be a bit more difficult, because we 
lack the built-in authentication and identification that the old proprietary 
services offered.  For the most part, however, it is usually possible to catch 
or at least identify bad actors online. 
The modalities of regulation remain the same today as in 1990.  The 
government can still intervene if there is a problem online.  If someone e-
mails a threat to the President, the government will do what it takes to find 
out the identity of that person, either by looking at clues in the threat itself, 
such as the text of the e-mail, or through the Lessig move of demanding 
information from the ISP.  Alternatively, you see governments starting to 
impose regulations and shaping the services that Internet companies offer.  
The configuration of control has remained the same, just with a different set 
of players, themselves mediated through the Internet. 
B.  Censorship 
This picture becomes a bit more troubling when one realizes that among 
the governments engaging in this regulation are regimes like that of China.  
It was originally thought that this new system would cause problems for 
China, that the Chinese government would face the problem of regulating 
its own people because of the difficulties of regulating the Internet.8  
However, the Chinese government can still lean on plenty of intermediaries 
to control its citizens’ access to the Internet.  In fact, we are seeing a 
shakeout in recent times of an increasing handful of intermediaries without 
whom you would truly feel that your Internet experience was incomplete:  
think of Google, or even Facebook.  If someone took away your top five 
most visited sites, you would feel yourself to be missing a lot.  For this 
reason, maybe the polyarchy is not as “poly” as we think; some of these 
intermediaries and companies are starting to slide towards hierarchy.  As 
they do so, the opportunities for top-down regulation are multiplying, 
whether or not you think the source of the regulation is legitimate.  This is 
the blowback story of the modern Internet, which gives cause for concern 
even as we know that the average person’s access to information—to 
material his government does not want him to see—is greater today than it 
was yesterday, and will continue to improve. 
The incentives for government control of information are not new, but 
the Internet poses a greater threat for widespread public dissemination of 
undesirable information.  A few years ago, there was one particular science 
 
  8. See  generally James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace:  Surveillance, Sovereignty, and 
Hardwired Censors, 66 U.  CIN.  L.  REV. 177 (1997) (describing the inadequacies of the 
theory of “digital libertarianism”). ZITTRAIN_10_04_21_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/23/2010  9:52 AM 
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paper that showed how easy it would be to poison the milk supply.9  
Terrorists have yet to target milk, but the academic paper said they could.  It 
is unclear what the proper government response is in this situation, if any.  
Some might argue that the benefit of the paper was not worth the risk of 
exposing this information to hostile parties; if so, it becomes tempting to 
suppress risky information.10 
The same thing happened with the EPA’s luridly titled “Worst-Case 
Scenarios.”  In 1998, the EPA asked various chemical plants and factories 
to imagine the worst thing that could happen, the event that could hurt as 
many people as possible, involving their instrumentality.  They compiled a 
database of these worst-case scenarios for the purpose of informing nearby 
people.  The FBI strongly resisted posting this information online; it 
seemed too tempting for aspiring terrorists.11  The compromises attempted 
with respect to the information seem quaint now.  The EPA established 
government reading rooms, which anyone could enter but in which 
recording devices were banned.12  One could, in the privacy of his or her 
own mind, read the worst-case scenario and leave.  Terrorists would have to 
remember everything on their own.  It was a totally well-meaning 
compromise, but one with an element of comicality to it.  It is unclear that it 
was worth the EPA’s effort to produce those particular facts in the first 
place. 
More recently, Internet-based corporations are beginning to run up 
against the preferences of various governments.13  Google, beginning with 
Google.cn in 2006, agreed to self-censor under threats from the Chinese 
government, though Google has since ceased such self-censorship on 
Google.cn and moved its Chinese search services to the Hong Kong-based 
Google.com.hk.14  Microsoft has also had to grapple with these issues; if 
someone attempts to title a Microsoft-platform blog with any prohibited 
words—free speech, democracy, human rights, and so forth—an error 
message will pop up.15  The user will have to choose a different title.16 
 
  9.  Lawrence M. Wein & Yifan Liu, Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply:  
The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 9984 (2005). 
  10. This pressure to suppress can result in what is now commonly known as the 
“Streisand Effect,” in which efforts to censor information can result in its greater popularity 
and dissemination. See Wikipedia, Streisand Effect, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Streisand_effect (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
  11. See Courtney Macavinta, Battle over Worst-Case EPA Data Online, CNET NEWS, 
July 10, 1998, http://news.cnet.com/Battle-over-worst-case-EPA-data-online/2100-1023_3-
213186.html. 
  12. See Kerry E. Rodgers, The Limits of Collaborative Governance:  Homeland Security 
and Environmental Protection at U.S. Ports, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 223–24 (2007). 
  13. See POST, supra note 5, at 164–69. 
  14.  Posting of David Drummond to The Official Google Blog, A New Approach to 
China:  An Update, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-
update.html (Mar. 22, 2010, 12:03 PST). 
  15. See  Microsoft Censors Chinese Blogs, BBC  NEWS, June 14, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4088702.stm. 
  16.  Interestingly, this censorship extends only to the name for the blog, not for 
individual entries, from which one may infer an attempt to trumpet compliance with ZITTRAIN_10_04_21_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/23/2010  9:52 AM 
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C.  The Historical Record 
For years, businesses ended up with paper records that turned out to have 
a certain Newtonian momentum to them.  A business had to affirmatively 
shred documents it wished to keep undiscovered.  More recently, services 
have developed that promise to turn the Newtonian momentum into 
Aristotelian motion, where the transmission of information stops unless its 
owner keeps pushing it forward.  An example of this is a company that used 
to be called Disappearing Inc., later called Omniva.17  Their business plan is 
based on what they portray as the “problem” with e-mail:  that it is easy to 
distribute and nearly impossible to erase.  Their solution entails requiring a 
proprietary client to read every e-mail you send.  E-mails can only be read 
and displayed using keys.  These keys are time based; they are set to expire 
after some fixed period, perhaps a year.  After that time period expires, the 
keys are destroyed.  Once this happens, all the copies out there that require 
that key for decryption are no longer accessible.  This flips the paradigm:  
no longer does information exist until you destroy it; rather, it does not exist 
unless you affirmatively find a way to save it. 
Similar problems of information permanence arise in other contexts.  For 
instance, should the Google Books system succeed, it would make no sense 
for a library to store thousands of physical books in its basement.  Rather, 
under the Google Books plan, there is one master copy of the book in 
Google’s possession.18  The library partners display it and access it 
according to particular privileges.  A user can access it from anywhere.  
This raises a huge problem, what can be thought of as the Fort Knox 
problem.19  If one book in the system contains infringing material, the 
rights-holder can get a court order requiring the infringing pages of the 
book to be deleted from the Google server.  Google has no choice but to 
comply, at least as long as it continues to be headquartered in the United 
States.  This order affects every book that is distributed through the Google 
platform.  Anyone who does not own a physical copy of the book will now 
lack access to that section of the book—or the entire thing.  Add in 
defamation or any other cause of action, and holes begin to appear in the 
historical record in a way they did not before. 
Once this threat is pointed out, there is a tendency to think of it as 
important but not urgent.  People seem to assume that we can deal with it 
 
censorship demands without true obedience to a politically problematic doctrine. See 
RConversation, Microsoft Takes Down Chinese Blogger, http://rconversation.blogs.com/
rconversation/2006/01/microsoft_takes.html (Jan. 3, 2006, 11:06 EST).  
  17. Omniva was later acquired by Liquid Machines, which continues to offer similar 
data management plans. See Press Release, Liquid Machines, Liquid Machines Acquires 
Omniva Policy Systems (Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.liquidmachines.com/content511.html. 
  18. See  generally Google Books Settlement Agreement, http://books.google.com/
googlebooks/agreement/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
  19.  The “Fort Knox problem” arises when information is stored and controlled in a 
single centralized location.  Anyone with access to that location could tamper with or 
remove information from circulation entirely; libraries and others would have no recourse as 
there exist few or no other ready copies of the material to which they might refer.  ZITTRAIN_10_04_21_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/23/2010  9:52 AM 
2776  FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol.  78 
later, even though the systems are being designed and implemented right 
now.  One helpful catalyst was an incident that could not have been 
invented better than it happened in reality.  Somebody offers, through 
Amazon, a Kindle version of 1984 by George Orwell.20  People buy it.  
Later, Amazon has reason to think there is a copyright issue that was not 
cleared by the source who put it on Amazon.  Amazon panics and sends a 
signal that actually deletes 1984 off of all the Kindles.  It is as if the user 
never bought 1984.  That is terrifying.  That is the Fort Knox problem.  It is 
not literally cloud computing; for the period of time the user possesses 
1984, it technically resided physically on his or her Kindle.  But because it 
is not the user’s to copy or to process, and it is Amazon’s to reach in and 
revise or manipulate, it is as good as the Google Books configuration—or, 
in this case, as bad. 
III.  THE CYBERSECURITY PROBLEM 
Most frightening are the implications of the Fort Knox problem for 
cybersecurity.  There is not yet consensus within the relevant communities 
about how bad the cybersecurity problem actually is, certainly not what to 
do about it, but there is rising panic over the situation.  As long ago as 2003, 
the U.S. Cybersecurity Advisor produced The National Strategy To Secure 
Cyberspace.21  The first half comprised dire predictions, imagining a digital 
Pearl Harbor and sending a clear message to the public:  be afraid, be very 
afraid.  The second half’s recommendations, which called for such things as 
public-private partnerships, seemed insignificant given the gravity of the 
threat. 
Last year the FBI said that “[c]yber attacks pose the greatest threat to the 
United States after nuclear war and weapons of mass destruction.”22  One 
article described how “US experts warn of ‘cybergeddon’, in which an 
advanced economy—where almost everything of importance is linked 
to . . . computers—falls prey to hackers, with catastrophic results.”23  This 
the FBI believes, and I believe.24  Many sectors of our government are 
terrified of a somewhat amorphous, but multifaceted, cybersecurity threat.  
Other people are also out there beating the drum of fear about 
cybersecurity, insisting we worry about it.25  This runs up against the crowd 
 
  20. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics from Kindle.  (One Is ‘1984.’), N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 2009, at B1. 
  21.  U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE 
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE (2003), available at http://www.us-cert.gov/
reading_room/cyberspace_strategy.pdf. 
 22.  Sebastian  Smith,  FBI Warns of Cyber Attack Threat, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 
Jan. 7, 2009, http://news.smh.com.au/world/fbi-warns-of-cyber-attack-threat-20090107-
7bot.html. 
  23. Id. 
  24. See,  e.g., Ellen Nakashima, FBI Director Warns of ‘Rapidly Expanding’ 
Cyberterrorism Threat, WASH.  POST, Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/04/AR2010030405066.html.  
  25.  Posting of Kim Zetter to Threat Level, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/
csis-report-on-cybersecurity/ (Jan. 28, 2010, 14:30 PST). ZITTRAIN_10_04_21_APPROVED_PAGINATED 4/23/2010  9:52 AM 
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of Internet nerds, who park themselves in the bottom right corner of the 
chart, smug in their own technological defense abilities, and who firmly 
resist all efforts at regulation.  This tension is part of what makes 
cybersecurity such a difficult problem. 
It was not that long ago when many sovereigns actually came down on 
the other side of the cybersecurity ledger, and many may still remain there.  
There is a member of the German government who has suggested that the 
country resort to denial-of-service attacks in order to take down neo-Nazi 
websites.26  In other words, if Google does not improve their neo-Nazi 
filtering in Germany or, maybe, the entire world, Germany might just take 
matters into its own hands.  Certainly any government, including the United 
States, holds the double-edged official policy that it should be impervious 
to cyberattack but, at the same time, possess a cyberattack capability—that 
its networks should be invulnerable even though it should be able to bring 
down any computer or system anywhere. 
IV.  SOLUTIONS 
To pull together the threads of cybersecurity regulation now on the table, 
let us return to the chart and, in particular, to the fourth quadrant, the one on 
the lower left.  Right now, when problems arise, people tend to turn first to 
the governmental or corporate quadrants.  Solutions originating there might 
help, but they also carry costs—costs that are magnified when the problems 
happen in the bottom quadrants.  For example, when a cyberattack happens, 
victims look for help from Symantec and other digital Pinkertons who exist 
in the top right, akin to hiring bodyguards and escorts to assist in transport 
along a dangerous highway.  Those victims who are unwilling or unable to 
write the big check that corporate help requires are left with whatever free 
solutions and government assistance are available.  Possibly, however, there 
are some solutions that can come from the quadrant on the lower left, the 
sector that otherwise might not seem as intuitive or common as the others.  
These solutions are on the left side of the diagram because they will bind 
people even if everyone does not agree.  But at the same time, these are 
solutions built of the Internet among its participants, rather than answers 
sent down from government actors; they properly belong at the bottom of 
the chart.27  They have their own drawbacks, but because we rarely look 
here for solutions, there may be opportunities that are less well known than 
the well-worn formats of government and corporate intervention. 
The basic idea is built upon a commitment to solving the Fort Knox 
problem by eliminating, or at least backing up, any monopolistic repository 
 
  26.  Steve Kettmann, Nebraska Neo-Nazi Irks German Pol, WIRED, Jan. 10, 2002, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2002/01/49566 (“[German Interior Minister Otto 
Schily] suggested that the German government itself might engage in denial-of-service 
attacks—in effect, hacking—to shut down some sites based in the United States.”). 
  27. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:  The Formulation of Information 
Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998) (discussing rules created by 
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of information.  Libraries are a step ahead in this area; there is an initiative 
called LOCKSS—Lots of Copies Keeps Stuff Safe—based at Stanford.28  
LOCKSS envisions a role for libraries to play that is also emerging as an 
answer to the problem of the Google Books (or even Kindle) situation.   
Google Books provides a great example:  let Google do exactly what it is 
doing, but make sure participating trusted libraries each get their own 
master copy of what Google has.  The libraries put it under their own lock 
and key.  Every so often, they check their master copy against the copies 
held by other libraries and the Google master copy to make sure the book 
has not changed.  If there is a change, it is clear that somebody has had a 
hand in the cookie jar, and the libraries can start to talk about what happens 
next.  Rather than just having one place to serve process and send a national 
security letter or court order demanding redaction or alteration, now any 
disgruntled party has to engage with dozens or hundreds of public-minded 
organizations to see whether they are all ready to turn that key together and 
decree that the past shall be changed.  This creates a useful friction in the 
system, while still preserving opportunity for removing material so truly 
damaging that it belongs down the Memory Hole. 
It is even possible to imagine inverting the Disappearing Inc./Omniva 
paradigm of Aristotelian informational momentum.29  Instead of having 
digital archives of classified and government information that automatically 
delete themselves after a period of time, why not encrypt them with keys 
that after 30, 40, or 50 years go public one day at a time?  Only if the 
government takes the initiative to go back and redesignate something as 
private will it stay out of the public eye.  Decryption keys could be put in 
the hands of the libraries or in some other escrow; the vaults of government 
data and reports would open only at the proper time. 
As a concrete example of a solution originating in a bottom-up fashion, 
though from the right side of the chart rather than the left, consider the 
Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine.30  This was designed by just one 
person—Brewster Kahle—who happened to decide that somebody ought to 
keep a copy of the Web.31  In what was probably the largest copyright 
infringement ever, he copied everything online and put it into a database.  
This is a wonderful library of information, and Brewster is a hero.  But 
Brewster is still one guy, and Internet Archive is only one address on which 
to serve process.  The company has not yet been sued out of existence in 
part because it is so accommodating.  Anyone can request that their material 
 
  28. LOCKSS, Home Page, http://lockss.stanford.edu/lockss/Home (last visited Apr. 7, 
2010).  Its icon is a tortoise, both because the tortoise lives so long and because it is so 
boring that no one notices it. LOCKSS, About Us, http://lockss.stanford.edu/lockss/
About_LOCKSS (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).  
 29.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
  30.  Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
  31. See Heather Green, A Library as Big as the World, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2002, 
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be excluded from the project, and Internet Archive will comply.32  They do 
keep a copy of the data, mindful of its value into the future, but it is no 
longer publicly accessible. 
The principle of distribution rather than centralization is really one of 
mutual aid, and it can be extended to the cybersecurity problem.  Imagine a 
user attempting to follow some link to a particular site, but the site has been 
brought down by a denial-of-service attack, by a government order, or 
anything else.  That site was, in a way, a miniature Fort Knox; the user has 
no alternative route to access its contents.  She sees the link, but the link 
does not persist.  To Web engineers (and to the site owner), this is a real 
problem.  Uniform resource locators are meant to be uniform, not just 
across place but across time.  What could we do that does not involve the 
creation of a centralized Fort Knox solution like the Internet Archive to 
prevent this from happening? 
It is time for a metaphorical NATO for the Internet, not among states but 
among Internet participants, something built into its fabric through Web 
servers and clients.  There is strength in numbers, and we can draw upon 
those principles of mutual aid that built the Internet to begin with in order to 
gather otherwise powerless individual entities together into a stronger force.  
The heart of the proposal is simple:  mirror as you link.33  As one website is 
rendering the page of links in response to a user’s request, it actually goes 
and fetches the contents of those links.  The website stores not just its own 
information but everything it links to as well.  If one site later fails or is 
blocked, the user can request a copy of it from the server that linked him 
there.34  This system can be made “opt-in” in the sense that before one site 
copies the content from another, it checks for consent, which mitigates the 
potential copyright issues.  Each participating site embodies the principle of 
mutual aid:  if one site goes down, others will duplicate and disseminate its 
information.  In exchange, that one site promises to do the same for those 
sites to whom it links. 
This extremely simple configuration is implementable with just a few 
tweaks to the two major Web servers in the world:  Apache and Microsoft.  
It would transform the nature of information retention, and it would support 
the construction of a historical record that now contains so much 
information that is born and remains digital rather than being archived and 
catalogued through traditional means.  As an added bonus, if information is 
unreachable not because of an attack on the server but because of filtering 
imposed somewhere in the network, by the ISP or by a government, the 
 
  32. See Internet Archive, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.archive.org/about/
faqs.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
  33. Again, I am grateful to Tim Berners-Lee for several discussions that refined some 
complicated implementations into this more elegant formulation. 
  34. A group of academics in the Netherlands has previously suggested a similar 
protocol-based solution. See Globule: An Open-Source Content Distribution Network, 
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system still works flawlessly.  Essentially, the system functions as a supply-
side circumvention tool.35 
In addition, the system removes the question of individual liability.  No 
single website need worry about disobeying the filtering orders of the 
Chinese government; they are all merely participating in a Web robustness 
scheme that also happens to deal with censorship as well as cybersecurity 
attacks.  All thanks to the characteristics of this fourth quadrant. 
The power and potential of the fourth quadrant has already been well 
illustrated by, among others, Wikipedia.  Wikipedia began as the ultimate 
bottom-up hallucination:  a reliable, multimillion-article, global 
encyclopedia built on the backs of volunteer editors.  Wikipedia has worked 
so well that it has migrated further and further to the left of the chart—so 
far, now, that if Wikipedia says something bad about a person, that person 
cannot solve the problem by declining to use Wikipedia.  Nor does 
Wikipedia represent a single point of access for that person to contact and 
complain.  Instead, problems have to be solved collectively; revisions 
cannot be imposed from above. 
The benefits of this collective effort reveal themselves in surprising 
places:  for instance, the unexpectedly famous, or perhaps infamous, 
Canadian student known as “Star Wars Kid.”  In 2002, this student taped 
himself swinging a golf ball retriever around and pretending it was a light 
saber.  He then returned the video recorder to the school with this film still 
on it.  Somehow, someone else found the footage and put it on the Internet, 
where it became incredibly popular, much to the student’s great dismay.  
The phenomenon got a large amount of media attention, a lot of which 
included the student’s name.  But if you look at the Wikipedia entry for Star 
Wars Kid,36 which is very informative, his name is not mentioned 
anywhere.37  Why not?  It turns out that the Wikipedia editors who worked 
on this page carried on an extensive discussion, found on the discussion 
page that corresponds to the article, about whether the article ought to 
include the student’s name.38  Some argued that Wikipedia stands for truth 
and openness, so his name ought to go in for the sake of complete 
disclosure.39  Others argued that the student wanted privacy, and his name 
was not material to the cultural significance of the phenomenon.  The 
second group won, and the student’s name has stayed off the page.  The 
dozens, perhaps hundreds, of volunteer editors who worked on this page 
 
  35. By building the system into the fabric of the two major servers, it can reach and 
assist a much greater audience than the currently available, often technologically daunting, 
circumvention approaches such as Tor. See Tor:  Anonymity Online, http://www.torproject.org 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
  36. Wikipedia, Star Wars Kid, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Star_Wars_Kid (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2010). 
  37. See Jonathan Zittrain, A Simple Way To Avoid Being the Next Star Wars Kid, 
SUNDAY TIMES (London), May 4, 2008, § 4, at 8. 
 38.  See Wikipedia, Star Wars Kid Discussion Page, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Talk:Star_Wars_Kid (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
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turned out to have greater discretion and respect for privacy than the 
mainstream media. 
So this example begins to demonstrate the influence and respect that 
Wikipedia has attained among its editors and users.  Once the losers of a 
Wikipedia editorial argument agree that the mob has spoken and reached an 
alternate conclusion, they will then enthusiastically enforce the outcome 
they argued so strongly against.  There is real power in the fourth quadrant.  
And as long as there are more right people than wrong people, the fourth 
quadrant actually provides a means of policing so many of those online 
areas that cry out for policing. 
There are, of course, some potential excesses and problems with the 
fourth quadrant.  For instance, during the 1990s, there were two competing 
private solutions to the growing spam problem:  the Mail Abuse Prevention 
System (MAPS), founded by Paul Vixie, and the Open Relay Behavior 
Modification System (ORBS).  MAPS functioned as a mutual aid treaty of 
sorts—people would report to the organization with the IP addresses of 
spammers they had encountered.  MAPS would keep a running list, and 
mail servers could sign up to subscribe to the list and block the specified IP 
addresses.  Of course, it was hard for anyone on the blacklist to get off of it, 
since their e-mails asking for a second chance never got through.  ORBS, 
on the other hand, used robots to send test e-mails.  The system then 
condemned any mail server that let its test messages back through to itself, 
on the principle that those mail servers were obviously not vigilant enough.  
Each organization, frustrated by the other’s divergent approach, blacklisted 
the other.40 
CONCLUSION 
In short, the fourth quadrant is not a cure-all.  In fact, all four zones have 
their drawbacks.  Nonetheless, the fourth quadrant, at this point, holds the 
most promising and underexplored solutions.  The key is to draw directly 
upon the netizens, the Web servers, the Wikipedians, those who operate in 
good faith, to try to make the Internet a better place.  Any Internet user can 
ask for help from the lower-right quadrant, or even initiate a project like 
mirror-as-you-link by simply starting it off and seeing what happens.  Then, 
if it gathers enough momentum, it ends up in the fourth quadrant.  A 
successful project just becomes the fabric of the web, moving from 
polyarchy to hierarchy just as the Web itself did.  In many circumstances, 
this form of group self-help, empowered through technological protocols, 
can make progress on real problems without having to invoke the 
sometimes-effective but also structurally worrisome machinery of 
government regulation or corporate intervention. 
 
 40.  See Kieren McCarthy, The ORBS/MAPS Anti-spam Battle Revisited, REGISTER, July 
20, 2000, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/07/20/the_orbs_maps_antispam_battle/. 